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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 18-3710 
_________________ 
 
GARY MILLER,  
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY 
 
_________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-06370) 
District Judge:  Hon. Kevin McNulty 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2019 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, FUENTES, FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  October 11, 2019) 
 
 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION**  
_________________ 
 
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
After being terminated, Gary Miller, a former utility systems maintainer for The 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the “Port Authority”), brought suit under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the Port Authority failed to 
reasonably accommodate his religious practices of observing the Jewish Sabbath and other 
Jewish holidays.  The District Court granted the Port Authority’s motion for summary 
judgment, and Miller timely appealed.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
I.  Background 
Miller worked as a utility systems maintainer for the Port Authority at Newark 
Liberty International Airport (“EWR”) from January 2, 2015 until his termination on 
March 21, 2015.  He was staffed in EWR’s Mechanical Maintenance Unit (“Unit 329”), 
which is responsible for, inter alia, the operation, maintenance, and repair of utility systems 
and related equipment at EWR.  Unit 329 consists of fourteen utility service maintainer 
positions.  Four utility service maintainers with the highest seniority are assigned to work 
Monday to Friday from 7:00 AM to 3:00 PM, and the remaining ten utility service 
maintainers rotate shifts as part of a neutral rotational schedule.1  Utility service 
maintainers select their timeslot in the rotational schedule based on seniority.  Because 
                                              
1 The 40-hour rotating schedule is divided by shifts.  The “A” shift requires seven 
consecutive days of work from 11:00 PM to 7:00 AM, followed by two regular days off.  
The “B” shift requires six consecutive days of work from 7:00 AM to 3:00 PM, followed 
by three days off.  The “C” shift requires seven consecutive days of work from 3:00 PM to 
11:00 PM, followed by two days off.   
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Miller had the lowest seniority of any utility service maintainer in Unit 329, he was 
assigned to the only vacant position, which required him to work Friday evenings and 
Saturdays.  
At all relevant times, utility service maintainers in Unit 329 were members of the 
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 68 (the “Union”), and subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement between the Port Authority and the Union (the 
“Memorandum of Agreement”).  The Memorandum of Agreement dictated terms and 
conditions of Miller’s employment, including, but not limited to, the use of personal 
excused days, use of vacation days, and changes to work schedules.  The Port Authority 
was not allowed to unilaterally make changes to existing works schedules under the 
Memorandum of Agreement. 
On January 5, 2015, Miller, as an observant of the Jewish faith, spoke with Albert 
Kosakowski, Chief Maintenance Supervisor at EWR, and requested a religious 
accommodation so that he not be required to work on the Jewish Sabbath, which begins at 
sunset on Friday and ends at sunset on Saturday, or on Jewish holidays.2  Miller’s preferred 
accommodation meant he would not work B or C shifts on Fridays and no shifts on 
Saturdays.  Upon being informed of Miller’s requested accommodation, Sarah McKeon, 
the Manager of Airport Maintenance at EWR, consulted with Kosakowski, Maintenance 
Unit Supervisor William Lynch, the Port Authority’s Office of Equal Employment 
                                              
2 Miller specifically requested that he be allowed to leave work at least four hours before 
sunset on Fridays, and that he be allowed not to commence work any sooner than two hours 
after sunset on Saturdays.  Not all holidays required that Miller miss a shift at work.  
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Opportunity, the Human Resources Department, and the Law Department.  McKeon 
denied Miller’s preferred accommodation because of the “critical functions of a [utility 
service maintainer] and the requirement to have continuous coverage at EWR,” the 
constraints imposed by the Memorandum of Agreement, potential overtime costs, and the 
effect on employee morale if other utility service maintainers were required to work 
additional weekend shifts.3  Thereafter, McKeon met with Miller and informed him that he 
had the option of swapping shifts with other employees and using vacation days, personal 
excused time, or compensatory time to observe religious holidays.4   
Miller subsequently used personal excused time for religious purposes from January 
2015 to late February 2015.  On February 28, 2015, Miller attempted to use excused time 
off to observe the Sabbath; however, the request was denied because, at the time, Miller 
did not have enough excused time to cover his request.  Miller did not attempt to use his 
vacation time for this request.  Nor is there clear evidence that Miller attempted to swap 
shifts with another utility service maintainer in Unit 329.  On February 28, 2015, Miller 
did not appear for work and was marked absent without leave.  Miller’s unexcused absence 
required the Port Authority to pay overtime to another utility service maintainer to cover 
Miller’s shift.   
                                              
3 A. 140.  While Miller contends that the Port Authority denied his request for an 
accommodation on the same date he began his employment, the evidence only shows that 
the Port Authority denied Miller’s preferred accommodation, not that it denied Miller any 
accommodation.   
4 Miller was also informed that the Port Authority would allow him to initiate more than 
two mutual tour swaps, despite this being a variance from the Memorandum of Agreement. 
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Miller subsequently requested time off on four occasions in March 2015 for 
religious reasons, and the Port Authority denied those requests because it required coverage 
for those four shifts, Miller did not have additional personal days or compensatory time to 
cover the shifts, and unpaid leave, as Miller requested, was not a permitted or recognized 
form of leave.  Miller did not attempt to use vacation days or utilize the option of mutual 
swaps to cover these shifts.5  Despite the Port Authority denying his requests for leave, 
Miller failed to appear for work and the Port Authority marked him as absent without leave.  
In view of his unexcused absences, the Port Authority terminated Miller’s employment on 
March 21, 2015. 
 Miller then filed suit, alleging that the Port Authority did not provide a reasonable 
accommodation for his religious observances.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for the Port Authority.6  The District Court concluded that the Port Authority 
offered Miller a reasonable accommodation and that, in the alternative, Miller’s preferred 
accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on the Port Authority.7  This 
appeal followed.  
                                              
5 Miller testified during his deposition that he could not recall whether he attempted to 
initiate mutual tour swaps.  However, he also testified that, although he could not recall 
their names, he spoke with other utility service maintainers but did not “find anyone to 
swap with.”  A. 402–03.  In Miller’s declaration, he stated that he made good faith efforts 
to swap shifts with other utility service maintainers.  Miller did not provide any further 
details concerning his purported attempts to initiate mutual swaps with other utility service 
maintainers. 
6 Miller v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 351 F. Supp. 3d 762 (D.N.J. 2018).   
7 Id. at 788–91. 
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II. Standard of Review8 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, making all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.9  Summary judgment is appropriate 
only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law,10 and we may affirm the grant of summary judgment on 
any basis supported by the record.11 
III.  Discussion 
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, an 
“employee must show: (1) she holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job 
requirement; (2) she informed her employer of the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for 
failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.”12  Once the employee satisfies these 
elements, the burden “shifts to the employer to show either it made a good-faith effort to 
reasonably accommodate the religious belief, or such an accommodation would work an 
undue hardship upon the employer and its business.”13  
The parties do not dispute that Miller established a prima facie case of religious 
discrimination based on a failure to accommodate.  Instead, the parties dispute whether the 
                                              
8 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over Miller’s Title VII claim under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
9 Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013). 
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
11 See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
12 Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
13 Id. 
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Port Authority satisfied its burden of showing either that it offered Miller a reasonable 
accommodation, or that doing so would impose an undue hardship.  
Miller argues that the Port Authority did not offer any accommodation because he 
was not told that he could use vacation time, the Port Authority made no effort to facilitate 
voluntary mutual swaps with other utility service maintainers, and the Port Authority failed 
to engage in an “interactive process” with Miller.  We disagree.   
Although “Title VII does not define what is a ‘reasonable accommodation,’” the 
Supreme Court has “made clear” that “a sufficient religious accommodation need not be 
the ‘most’ reasonable one (in the employee’s view), it need not be the one that the employee 
suggests or prefers, and it need not be the one that least burdens the employee.”14  Simply 
put, when the employer offers any reasonable accommodation, the statutory inquiry is at 
an end.15   
First, the Port Authority made a good-faith effort to reasonably accommodate 
Miller’s religious practices by allowing him to use paid time off—including vacation, 
personal excused, and compensatory time—and to utilize voluntary mutual swaps with 
other utility service maintainers without restrictions.16  While Miller argues that he was not 
                                              
14 Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986)).   
15 See id. 
16 While Miller challenges these accommodations in isolation, we need not decide whether 
each accommodation was reasonable in isolation because they were all offered as part of 
the Port Authority’s attempt to accommodate Miller’s religious practices. See Sanchez-
Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 12–13 (1st Cir. 2012) (declining to 
consider the accommodations in isolation and concluding that the employer’s combined 
accommodations, including allowing the employee to swap shifts with his co-workers, 
constituted a reasonable accommodation of the employee’s religious beliefs); Getz v. 
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told he could use vacation time, the Port Authority submitted evidence showing that he was 
entitled to, and allowed to, take ten days of vacation time.  Indeed, under the collective 
bargaining agreement, new utility service maintainers are entitled to ten vacation days, 
which they can start using any time after starting their employment.  Miller’s paychecks 
similarly reflected his accrued vacation time.  Further, Miller’s claim that it would have 
been “absurd” for him to have refused to take vacation time,17 especially when his requests 
for time off were denied in March 2015, is unconvincing and insufficient to rebut the Port 
Authority’s documentary evidence showing that Miller was entitled to use vacation time.  
Indeed, Miller testified that he did not recall how many vacation days he had, not that he 
was under the impression that he did not have vacation days available.  Miller also testified 
that it was he who designated the type of time off requested, yet the Port Authority’s 
undisputed business records show that he never opted to use vacation time to accommodate 
                                              
Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 73–74 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that the employer provided 
a reasonable accommodation by allowing the employee to take religious holidays with pay 
as per the collective bargaining agreement but refusing to allow the employee to work 
overtime in order to accumulate additional vacation leave); see also Tabura v. Kellogg 
USA, 880 F.3d 544, 555 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[The employer] sought to accommodate 
Plaintiffs’ Sabbath observance through a combination of allowing them to use their 
vacation and other paid time off, as well as permitting Plaintiffs to swap shifts with other 
employees.  Such a combination might, under the facts of a particular case, reasonably 
accommodate an employee’s Sabbath observance.”); EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles 
Co., 515 F.3d 307, 315 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Through various mechanisms, each significant in 
their own right, [the employer] sought to assist [the employee] . . . . These accommodations 
plainly satisfied Title VII.”); Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1156 
(10th Cir. 2000) (holding employer offered reasonable accommodation where it approved 
use of leave on the employee’s day of Sabbath, permitted use of substitutes when possible, 
sought a waiver from the union of the requirement that the employee work five out of six 
days a week, and recommended the employee bid for other positions that would not require 
work on Sabbath).   
17 Appellant’s Br. at 15 (citing A. 1264). 
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his religious observances.  Simply put, Miller has not provided evidence to rebut the 
assertion that he was entitled to use vacation time but failed to do so.   
Second, Miller argues that the Port Authority’s voluntary swap policy is not a 
reasonable accommodation because the Port Authority did not make any efforts to facilitate 
swaps.  The record belies Miller’s claims.  Kosakowski made a public announcement to 
other utility service maintainers that Miller would be looking for voluntary, mutual swaps 
and encouraged them to consider his request.  Further, the Port Authority informed Miller 
that the schedule of all utility service maintainers would be made available to him and that 
a list of all Unit 329 staff with their personal telephone numbers could be found in the 
“Watch Engineers Office” at EWR.18  Miller’s dissatisfaction with the Port Authority’s 
efforts to facilitate mutual swaps does not create a genuine dispute as to whether the 
accommodation was reasonable.19   
                                              
18 A. 147. 
19 Miller’s argument that the Port Authority failed to engage in an “interactive process” 
with him before rejecting his preferred request for an accommodation is meritless.  While 
we have previously held that the Americans with Disabilities Act imposes a duty on both 
an employer and employee “to assist in the search for appropriate reasonable 
accommodation and to act in good faith,” Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 
149 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 
1997)), we have not yet imposed a similar duty on employers for Title VII religious 
accommodation claims.  However, even assuming a similar duty exists under Title VII, we 
agree with the District Court that the Port Authority engaged in good faith efforts by 
“carefully consider[ing] the relevant factors” in arriving at a reasonable accommodation.  
Miller, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 787.  While Miller points to purported inconsistencies between 
McKeon’s deposition testimony and her certification as to the efforts she undertook, he 
does not present evidence to rebut the Port Authority’s factual assertions that McKeon 
reviewed the schedules of other utility service maintainers, considered whether it was 
feasible to redo the schedule to avoid Miller working Fridays and Saturdays, considered 
the constraints of the collective bargaining agreement, reviewed past practices of Unit 329, 
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Therefore, we agree with the District Court that the Port Authority met its burden 
of showing that it reasonably accommodated Miller’s religious practices and that Miller 
failed to proffer evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.20  As a result, 
the Port Authority is entitled to summary judgment. 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the Port Authority. 
 
                                              
and considered the impact on employee morale if certain employees were required to work 
weekends in order to accommodate Miller. 
20 Because we find that the Port Authority offered Miller a reasonable accommodation, we 
need not reach the question of whether Miller’s preferred accommodation would have 
imposed an undue hardship.  Notwithstanding, for the reasons substantially stated in the 
District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, we would also affirm on this basis. 
